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Fall 2007 Volume II Issue III
Fall 2007 Volume II Issue III
1. Determining Noncompetitive Import Pricing: The Case of Belgium, France and the Netherlands Imports of Ugandan Chilled Fish Fillets Andrew Muhammad and Caleb Tamwesigire
Abstract
Although Belgium, France and the Netherlands import a significant percentage of chilled
2. LOUISIANA SEXUAL HARRASSMENT Albert D. Clark
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to give an overview of Sexual Harassment in the State of Louisiana as it affects Employment Law and to address changes in the approach used to adjudicate sexual harassment claims.
3. Risk Properties of a Stein-Like Estimator for the Conditional Logit Model Vera Tabakova R. Carter Hill
Abstract
Stein-rule estimators combine sample and nonsample information in a way that improves the precision of the estimation process or the quality of subsequent predictions. The existing literature shows that Stein-rule estimators may lead to squared error risk improvements in the linear regression, probit, and Box-Cox models. This paper provides comparisons of Stein-rule and maximum likelihood estimation techniques in the context of the conditional logit model. A Monte Carlo study is conducted to study the performance of the estimators in terms of squared error loss, information matrix weighted error loss and out-of-sample mean squared error of prediction.
fish fillets from Uganda, results suggest no significant degree of oligopsony power is exercised. If these countries dominate fish trade with Uganda, why are prices not significantly distorted? A possible explanation is given the number of importing firms in a country, market power may not be realized unless some form of collusion is possible (tacit or otherwise). This suggests that if Ugandan firms export to a few countries the competitive price should still prevail so long as there are many importing firms within these countries.